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Much of the debate over whether or not developing countries gain from regional trade
agreements (RTA’s) has focused on two characteristics that are common to developing countries:
their relatively high tariffs and their high trade dependencies on one or a few developed trade
partners.  In this paper, we address a third common characteristic: their use of distorting domestic
policies that are closely linked to trade restrictions.  We argue that participation in an RTA can
create pressures for domestic policy reforms.  We analyze the case of a small country, Mexico,
forming an RTA with two larger countries, the U.S. and Canada, in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Mexico exhibits all three characteristics of a developing country:
relatively high tariffs, a high trade dependency on the U.S., and an extensive and pervasive
system of farm support that was linked to the restriction of trade.  For the analysis, we use a 26-
sector, multi-country, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in which the three single-
country models are linked through trade flows, and farm programs are modeled in detail.  We
find that  there are welfare gains from trade liberalization in all three countries only when
domestic reforms are in place.  Mexico gains from NAFTA only when it also removes domestic
distortions in agriculture. Then, agriculture can generate allocative efficiency gains that are large
enough to offset the terms of trade losses which arise because Mexico has higher initial tariffs
than other RTA members. Table of Contents
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with a single-country model of the United States to analyze the effects of changes in agricultural
policies and exogenous shocks on U.S. agriculture ( Robinson, Kilkenny, and Hanson, 1990). 
See Kilkenny and Robinson (1990) and Kilkenny (1991) for an extension of that model to include
detailed U.S. farm programs.  See Hinojosa and Robinson (1991) and Burfisher, Robinson, and
Thierfelder (1992) for earlier versions of the U.S.-Mexico model used in this paper.
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I. Introduction
Much of the debate over whether or not developing countries gain from regional trade
agreements (RTA’s) has focused on two characteristics that are common to developing countries:
their relatively high tariffs, and their high trade dependencies on one or a few developed trade
partners.  In this paper, we address a third common characteristic:  their use of distorting
domestic policies that are closely linked to trade restrictions.  We argue that participation in an
RTA can create pressures for domestic policy reforms.  Because many domestic policies,
particularly in agriculture, insulate producers from changing market prices, these domestic
reforms can be crucial for the efficiency gains from trade liberalization to be realized. 
Furthermore, the pressure for domestic reform is stronger the higher the developing country’s
trade dependence on its RTA partner.  Since an RTA can force domestic adjustments that will be
necessary for global trade liberalization, it can be a building bloc towards multilateralism.
      
In this paper, we analyze the case of  a small country, Mexico, forming an RTA with two
larger countries, the U.S. and Canada, in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Mexico exhibits all three characteristics of a developing country: relatively high tariffs, a high
trade dependency on the U.S., and an extensive and pervasive system of farm support that was
linked to the restriction of trade.  For the analysis, we use a 26-sector, multi-country, computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model in which the three single-country models are linked through
trade flows, and farm programs are modeled in detail.  We simulate NAFTA under two  regimes:
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First, we assume the farm programs which restricted supply responses in the three countries
remained in place when NAFTA was implemented.   Next, we assume NAFTA occurs in an
environment with reformed, largely nondistorting farm programs evident in all three countries in
1997.  While domestic budgetary and political pressures were important motivations for the
domestic farm program reforms in all three countries over the past decade, we show that trade
policy reforms also created pressure for domestic policy changes.  We calculate the budget costs
of maintaining distortionary programs in the presence of open regional trade and show that the
RTA would have dramatically increased the cost of distortionary domestic programs in Mexico. 
The comparison of the two scenarios illustrates the effects domestic policy distortions have on
welfare changes following an RTA.
We find that trade creation exceeds trade diversion under NAFTA, whether or not
domestic reforms have occurred.  However, there are greater gains when domestic farm program In contrast, when the union partner is the supplier facing constant costs, an RTA
2
improves welfare in the liberalizing country. It benefits from the price reduction and still collects
tariff revenue from the countries excluded from the union. There is only trade creation from the
RTA. As Panagariya (1996) notes, this case is even better than multilateral tariff elimination due
to the tariff revenue collected. However, he argues it is usually the case that the rest of the world,
not the union partner, faces constant costs while union members face increasing costs. While
there will be trade creation for some commodities, the majority of goods will come from a partner
with increasing costs — trade diversion will dominate in most RTAs.
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reforms have been adopted.  Furthermore, there are welfare gains from trade liberalization in all
three countries only when domestic reforms are in place.  For Mexico, domestic farm program
reforms linked to NAFTA are critical: agriculture can now generate allocative efficiency gains that
are large enough to offset the terms of trade losses which arise because Mexico has higher initial
tariffs than other RTA members.  Mexico gains from NAFTA only when it also removes
domestic distortions in agriculture.
The next section reviews recent literature on the effects of RTAs versus multilateralism on
developing economies. Section three describes trade policies, domestic farm programs and trade
dependencies in NAFTA countries.  Section four presents the main features of our NAFTA-CGE
model, emphasizing our specification of agricultural policies.  Section five presents the empirical
results, and the final section presents conclusions.  
II. Recent Literature
Much of the debate over the benefits of regional trade agreements (RTA’s) versus
multilateral free trade addresses trade creation and trade diversion effects of an RTA. Bhagwati
and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1998, 1996) make the case for multilateralism by arguing
that small countries lose unambiguously from an RTA and gain unambiguously from
multilateralism. Because RTAs give preferential treatment to member countries, they divert trade
from non-member, least-cost suppliers. To illustrate the trade diversion effects of an RTA, they
present Viner's model of a customs union in which two countries remove bilateral tariffs. When
the rest of the world is the least cost supplier and faces constant costs, an RTA with the supplier
who faces increasing costs can only divert trade.  The liberalizing country loses because it
2
foregoes tariff revenue from the new union member but does not face a lower internal price for
the imported good, since the rest of the world determines its market price. In this framework, the
larger the trade partner’s share of total imports, the bigger the tariff revenue loss when an RTA is
formed. Similarly, the trade partner who initially has higher tariffs loses from an RTA because
more tariff revenue is redistributed away from it. Since developing countries often have high
trade dependencies and high tariffs,  Bhagwati and Panagariya argue that they will lose from an
RTA. They  make the case for multilateralism, arguing that the small country must gain when
domestic producers compete at the world price, and any tariff revenue transferred to the RTASchiff (1996) also discusses country size and the welfare impacts of an FTA.  Like
3
Panagariya, he argues that the smaller a country’s imports from its partner, the smaller the
welfare losses of foregone tariff revenue.  
This calculation uses aggregate trade and tariff numbers — the changes in total U.S.
4
exports to Mexico and the average wage.
See also Winters (1996) for a discussion of the theory with models that allow both trade
5
creation and trade diversion. De Rosa (1998) provides a balanced survey of theoretical models
that allow for both trade creation and diversion when an RTA is formed with a partner facing
either constant or increasing cost. 
3
partner will be returned to domestic consumers.
3
As an example of the damage an RTA does to a developing country, Panagariya (1997)
calculates welfare losses as high as $3.26 billion for Mexico from NAFTA. When making this
calculation, he assumes that the rest of the world is the least cost supplier with a horizontal export
supply curve and that the U.S. has increasing costs so its supply curve is upward sloping.  Since
Mexico had higher initial tariffs than the U.S., its loss of tariff revenue exceeds its gains from
preferential access to the U.S. market (foregone tariff revenue in the U.S.).
4
  De Melo et al. (1993) note that the case of pure trade diversion, while unambiguously
welfare-worsening, is too extreme a model to characterize actual RTAs.  They present a more
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balanced view of the welfare effects of an RTA in an analytical model in which integration both
creates and diverts trade. In this case, the country which lowers its barriers against a trade partner
faces a new domestic price which is lower than the tariff-inclusive mark-up over the constant cost
supplier (the rest of the world), but higher than the free trade price. The welfare effects on the
tariff-reducing country are ambiguous: it loses because it has diverted all imports from the lowest
cost supplier, but it benefits because total imports have increased. De Melo and others note that,
in this environment: (1) the higher the initial tariff on a given sector, the larger the benefits and the
smaller the costs of an RTA; (2) the lower the post-RTA tariff on non-union countries, the less
likely that the lower-priced goods of the latter will be displaced; and (3) the greater the
complementarity in import demands between the union partner, the greater the gains from an
RTA. The latter point suggests that there are large gains from an RTA between developed and
developing countries — such as the U.S. and Mexico — which have different factor
endowments. Determining the net welfare impact of an RTA in this model is an empirical issue. 
Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) survey the empirical literature in which multi-country
CGE models have been used to analyze the impact of regional trade agreements.  The  multi-
country CGE models differ widely in terms of country and commodity coverage, assumed
market structure, policy detail, and specification of macroeconomic closure. In spite of these
differences, surveys of these models support two general conclusions about the empirical effectsThey incorporate  two domestic distortions — rent-seeking activities associated with
6
import quotas and sector-specific minimum wages which induce rural-urban migration — in a
general equilibrium model of the Philippines.
Anderson uses a CGE model with nine developing countries and 15 agricultural sectors.
7
He simulates world price changes due to the Uruguay round, from Goldin and van der
Mensbrugghe (1995), in two versions of the base model — one with and the other without
distortions.  Anderson and Tyers (1993) perform similar simulations — world price shocks in a
model with and without domestic distortions in agriculture — in a partial equilibrium framework. 
They also find that domestic distortions are at least as important to domestic welfare as are trade
prices.
4
of regional trade agreements: (1) in aggregate, trade creation is always much larger than trade
diversion; and (2) welfare — measured in terms of real GDP or equivalent variation — increases
for member countries.
In addition to issues relating to trade diversion and tariff revenue losses, developing
countries also have domestic distortions which affect the welfare gains from an RTA.  Clarete and
Whalley (1988) discuss the links between domestic distortions and trade reform in a small open
economy.    They find significant interactions between trade and domestic policies and that the
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social cost of trade distortions are approximately doubled when distortions are included.   As
they conclude, “The lesson would seem to be that these interactions need to be considered more
fully in numerical economic policy analysis for developing countries.”  (p. 358).
Moving in that direction, Anderson (1997) evaluates the interaction between trade reform
under the Uruguay Round and domestic distortions in agriculture in developing countries.
He introduces the anticipated agricultural price increases in a general equilibrium model with
domestic distortions in agriculture. 
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Like Anderson, we consider the effects of trade liberalization with and without domestic
intervention in agriculture.  However, we model agricultural policies in more detail, not just as
exogenous price wedges. This lets us discuss domestic agricultural policies that are directly linked
to trade restrictions.  In this framework, trade liberalization, as under an RTA, increases the cost
of domestic support, creating pressure for reform.
III. Characteristics of NAFTA Countries
A.  Country size and trade dependence
GDP data indicate that Mexico is much smaller than the U.S., its primary trade partner.
Mexico accounts for  5.1 percent of NAFTA GDP,  while the U.S.  accounts for 87.5%.  Like
Mexico, Canada is relatively small in the region, accounting for only 7.4% of NAFTA GDP.In our NAFTA simulations, we maintain U.S. sugar import restrictions for Canada; we
8
eliminate the U.S. sugar quota against Mexico.
See Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1998) for a more detailed discussion of the
9
changes in domestic farm programs in each NAFTA country.
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Data on bilateral trade flows reveal a lopsided dependency between the U.S. and Mexico.
Mexico is heavily dependent on the U.S. for trade (table 1).    In 1993, 81.2% of its total exports
went to the U.S.  The U.S. was an even bigger market for Mexico’s agriculture as 94.2% of its
agricultural exports went to the U.S.  In contrast, the U.S. sent 7.4% of its total exports and 7.1%
of its agricultural exports to Mexico.  Similarly on the import side, Mexico is heavily dependent
on the U.S., which accounts for  80.0% of Mexico’s imports.  In agriculture Mexico’s
dependence is not as strong, with 61.0% of its imports coming from the U.S.  The U.S. relies on
Mexico for only 5.1% of its imports, however the dependence is stronger in agriculture for which
Mexico supplies 32.7% of the  U.S. total. 
B.  Trade restrictions
In general, pre-NAFTA tariff rates among the U.S. and Canada are low, while those of
Mexico are relatively high.  In table 2, we show the combined tariff rate equivalent of applied
tariffs and import quotas that were in place in 1993, the model base year.  Mexico has the highest
tariffs and tariff equivalent of quotas among NAFTA countries, with a trade weighted average of
7.9%.  In contrast, the trade weighted averages for the U.S. and Canada are 2.9% and 1.9%
respectively.  There is considerable intersectoral variation in tariff rates in all three countries.
Mexico has high trade restrictions in wheat (67%) and corn (90.4%), two crops which the U.S.
supports through endogenous input subsidies to maintain a fixed output price.  One implication
is that under NAFTA increased Mexican demand for U.S. wheat and corn will reduce the cost of
such price supports.  U.S. protection rates are high for sugar manufacturing (70%), reflecting the
U.S. sugar quota.
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C. Domestic distortions in agriculture
 
Domestic agricultural programs in all three NAFTA countries have undergone
fundamental change since the CUSTA and NAFTA agreements were first initiated (table 3).  In
general, these reforms have both lowered support levels and “decoupled” support by making
payments independent from farmers’ production decisions or market conditions.   
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In the U.S., farm program reforms began in the mid-1980's with the introduction of
increased planting flexibility and fixed base program acreage (USDA, 1996).  In 1996, the U.S.
adopted the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, whose main effect was to 
replace the crop-linked, deficiency payments/supply management program with a program of 
temporary “contract” payments based on land acreage enrolled in the former deficiency6
payments program.  The payments were capped at about $36 billion over 1996-2002, and
scheduled to decline over the 7-year program. 
Canada introduced its new generation of farm programs in 1991 under the Farm Income
Protection Act (FIPA).  Among the reforms was the elimination of grain freight subsidies by
August, 1995.  Subsidies were replaced with voluntary revenue insurance programs to which
producers and the federal and provincial governments contribute.  The Gross Revenue Insurance
Program (GRIP) has already been discontinued due to its high costs.  The Net Income
Stabilization Account (NISA) extends farm income risk management support to all grains,
oilseeds,  and some horticulture.  The government provides matching grants to farmers’
contributions to savings accounts.  Savings earn relatively high, subsidized rates of return and
farmers may withdraw funds during years of lower than average income. Canada continues to
support poultry, dairy, and eggs through supply management programs.  These programs rely on
production and import quotas to maintain farm prices for these commodities at levels that are
based on the costs of production.  Because the effectiveness of these programs requires trade
restrictions, Canada has exempted these three sectors from free trade under NAFTA.  Butter and
skim milk prices are additionally supported through marketing board purchases, and export
subsidies financed through levies on producers.  Direct payments to dairy producers were phased
out in 1996.    
Mexican agricultural policy reforms began in the late 1980's. In 1988, tariffs were sharply
lowered following Mexico’s accession to the GATT, and most import quotas were converted to
tariffs.  However, import licensing remained an important instrument for price support --
particularly for corn, a staple crop produced by Mexico’s large subsistence farm sector. 
Beginning in 1991, Mexico began to lower agricultural input subsidies, and the reduce the
pervasive role of the government in purchasing, storing and distributing agricultural commodities. 
Subsidies to corn and wheat millers were reduced, and most retail food price controls were
eliminated.  Guaranteed producer prices and government purchases were continued only for corn
and beans.  In 1993, in anticipation of NAFTA, Mexico adopted the PROCAMPO program. 
PROCAMPO is a 15-year, direct payments program that compensates producers for the loss of
input subsidies, price support, and import protection.  It was designed to provide transitional,
decoupled income support to farmers, while allowing Mexico’s agriculture to undergo structural
change in response to market conditions.  In 1996, Mexico announced the Alliance for the
Countryside (Alianza para al Campo), a major initiative to improve agricultural productivity. 
Alianza is an umbrella grouping that includes PROCAMPO and other programs. 
IV. The Model
A. Overview
The NAFTA-CGE model is a 26-sector, multi-country, CGE model of the U.S., Canada,The countries can also be linked through international migration flows.  To focus on the
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welfare effects of an RTA in a second-best environment, we chose not to include migration
flows.  See Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1992) for a discussion of US-Mexico trade
when migration can occur.
 Robinson (1989) surveys CGE models applied to developing countries.  Shoven and
11
Whalley (1984) survey models of developed countries.  The theoretical properties of this family
of trade-focused CGE models are discussed in Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1990). 
 We assume an elasticity of substitution between land types in Mexico of 0.8 in all
12
sectors.
 This treatment, whereby Mexican rural income in the migration equation includes both
13
wages and a share of land income, differs from that in Robinson, et al. (1993).  This specification
is closer to that of Levy and van Wijnbergen (1994), who describe migration as a function of
income or utility differentials.  
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and Mexico in which the three single-country models are linked through trade flows.   For the
10
purpose of describing the model, it is useful to distinguish between the individual “country”
models and the multi-region model system as whole, which determines how the individual
country models interact.  When the model is actually used, the within country and between
country relationships are solved for simultaneously. 
 
Each country CGE model follows closely what has become a standard theoretical
specification for trade-focused CGE models.   In addition to 26 sectors – including eight farm
11
and nine food processing – each country model has seven factors of production – four labor
types, two land types, and capital.   Land is disaggregated into irrigated and dryland in Mexico. 
Each crop uses both land types in production and it is assumed that the land types are poor
substitutes.   Both irrigated and dryland are perfectly mobile across crops.  In the United States,
12
each crop is grown using one of two possible land types.  One land type is used to produce either
fruits/vegetables, cotton, or other agricultural production.  The second land type is assumed to be
perfectly mobile among wheat, corn, other feed grains, and oilseeds production.  Capital is
mobile across sectors.  Labor is mobile across sectors, but it is segmented into four labor
categories.  There is some labor mobility between labor categories due to labor migration.  We
assume full employment and constant factor supplies. 
Mexican rural workers can migrate to urban unskilled labor markets in Mexico.  The
domestic factor supplies incorporate the migrant labor flows.  Migration is assumed to depend on
wage differentials.  In equilibrium, migration maintains a fixed wage differential between rural
and urban unskilled labor markets in Mexico.  The average wage, upon which labor bases its
migration decision, includes labor income plus a share of the dryland income for rural workers.  
13
Migration flows generated by the CGE model refer to changes from a base flow of zero.  They
should be viewed as additional migration flows due to the policy change, adding to (or reducing)8
current flows.
For each sector, the model specifies production, consumption and trade equations. 
Output supply is given by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value added production
functions, while intermediate inputs are demanded in fixed proportions.  Producers are assumed
to maximize profits, implying that each factor is demanded so that marginal revenue product
equals marginal cost.  However, factors do not receive a uniform wage or “rental” (in the case of
capital) across sectors; instead, we include sectoral factor market distortions that fix the ratio of
the sectoral return to a factor relative to the economy-wide average return for that factor.  These
factor market distortions can be interpreted as  productivity differences based on sectoral
differences in value added shares to each input. 
The single aggregate household in each economy has a Cobb-Douglas expenditure
function, consistent with optimization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function.  Sectoral household
consumption is a fixed share of household income.  Real investment and government
consumption by sector are constant in the model simulations.  Consumers demand a composite
of the imported and domestic variety of each good. 
Sectoral export-supply and import-demand functions are specified for each country.  In
common with other CGE models (both single and multi-country), the NAFTA-CGE model
specifies that goods produced in different countries are imperfect substitutes.  At the sectoral
level, in each country, demanders differentiate goods by country of origin and exporters
differentiate goods by destination market.  When modeling import demands, the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) specification is adopted.  This specification allows import expenditure
elasticities to be different from one and also allows cross-country substitution elasticities to vary
for different pairs of countries. Exports are supplied according to a CET function between
domestic sales and total exports, and allocation between export and domestic markets occurs in
order to maximize revenue from total sales.  The rest of the world is modeled simply as a supplier
of imports to and demander of exports from the three NAFTA countries.  Production activities in
the rest of the world are not explicitly modeled; instead, this region is assumed to have flat
export-supply curves and downward-sloping aggregate import-demand curves. With this
structure, we can  incorporate the key assumption of Bhagwati and Panagariya that supply from
RTA partner countries is less elastic than that from the rest of world.
In common with other CGE models, the model only determines relative prices and the
absolute price level must be set exogenously.  In our model, the aggregate consumer price index
in each sub-region is set exogenously, defining the numeraire.  The advantage of this choice is
that solution wages and incomes are in real terms.  The solution exchange rates in the sub-regions
are also in real terms, and can be seen as equilibrium price-level-deflated (PLD) exchange rates, De Melo and Robinson (1989) and Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1993) discuss the
14
role of the real exchange rate in this class of model.  We fix the exchange rate for the rest of
world, thereby defining the international numeraire. 
9
using the country consumer price indices as deflators.   World prices are converted into domestic
14
currency using the exchange rate, including any tax or tariff components.  Cross-trade price
consistency is imposed, so that the world price of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. are the same as
the world price of the U.S.’s imports from Mexico.
At the macro economic level, all income from production goes to the single household
which pays taxes and consumes based on fixed expenditure shares.  The government collects
taxes, administers transfer payments and has a fixed real expenditure on goods and services.  The
government budget deficit is endogenous.  Total savings of households, the government and
foreign capital must equal investment, which is fixed.  The household savings rate is endogenous
to insure that savings equals investment.  The current account is constant and the exchange rate
varies. 
Each country model traces the circular flow of income from producers, through factor
payments, to households, government, and investors, and finally back to demand for goods in
product markets.  The country models incorporate tariffs which flow to the government, and non-
tariff revenues which go to the private sector.  Each economy is also modeled as having a number
of domestic market distortions.  There are sectorally differentiated indirect taxes, as well as
household and corporate income taxes.  Production distortions in agriculture are modeled in
detail, as described below.  When we simulate NAFTA, we maintain domestic distortions in
sectors other than agriculture.
B.  Modeling Farm Programs
We model agricultural trade and domestic farm programs explicitly as either price
wedges, which affect output and labor migration decisions;  lump-sum income transfers; or as
switching regimes which respond to price or output targets.   The wedges and transfers are either
specified exogenously or determined endogenously, depending on the institutional characteristics
of the program being modeled.  See table 4 for a summary of the various programs, the variables
they affect and the countries in which they apply.  
Many of the 1993 policies  are “coupled” in that they influence producers’ decisions. 
These policies affect the producer's value added price, the payment to primary factors.  It is
calculated as  the unit value of production net of indirect taxes and payments to intermediate
goods.  Government subsidies are calculated per unit of output and are added to the value added
price as the producer incentive equivalent (PIE) (equation 1, table 5a).  A positive PIE increases
the payment to factors, pulling resources into the subsidized sector and increasing output.   Alternatively, the participation rate can be made endogenous, and changes in deficiency
15
payment expenditures would result from both changes in the deficiency payment and from
changes in base acreage.
To model this, we maintain an upper bound on the output level in these sectors.  When
16
there is pressure for output to expand beyond the constraint, the marginal factor productivity
declines; resources become more expensive, eliminating the incentive to expand output.
Both the supply and price management  policies are modeled as switching regimes using
17
the PATH solver in GAMS.  
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The components of the producer incentive equivalent vary by sector and by country.  In
Canada and Mexico, it consists of exogenous input subsidies whose rate varies by sector (see
table 3).  The PIE for Mexican corn millers  also includes endogenous payments under the
Guaranteed Price Program.  The Mexican government fixes the price of corn and compensates
the corn millers for the artificially  high price of inputs. In the United States, the PIE consists of 
the deficiency payments which are determined endogenously, and are not treated as fixed ad
valorem wedges.  Following Kilkenny (1991), and Kilkenny and Robinson (1990), we model the
U.S. deficiency payment as per unit of output as the difference between a fixed target price and
the market price.  We calculate the initial unit value of the deficiency payment from data on total
government expenditure on deficiency payments (including direct deficiency payments and
marketing loan deficiency payments), base output, and participation rates.  The unit value of the
deficiency payment is a component of the producer incentive equivalent (equation 2, table 5a). 
We fix the eligible production at the base year levels.   The total payment a farm receives is the
15
payment rate multiplied by eligible base production.  Planting flexibility introduced under the
1990 Farm Bill is captured by treating 50% of deficiency payments as direct payments, or income
transfers.   
In all three  countries, direct payments are modeled as income transfers to the household,
and are decoupled from producers’ decision-making.  In Mexico, the direct payment also
supplements the rural wage, thereby influencing the rural migration decision. In the U.S., the
direct payment is assumed to be capitalized in returns to land. In Canada, NISA payments are
assumed to be nondistorting household income transfers.  
Canada restricts the supply of livestock and poultry. Producers minimize cost subject to a
constraint on the level of output (equation 6, table 5a).   Similarly, Canada also maintains a fixed
16
price for dairy manufacturing (equation 7, table 5a).  We impose a lower bound on the output
price.  When there is pressure for the price to fall below the target price, the government
subsidizes exports to bolster the price to farmers.
17
All countries impose tariffs and quotas on farm and food processing sectors (equations 4
and 5, table 5a).  These border policies indirectly affect the producer value added price throughSince we start from different base models, we must compare absolute, not percent,
18
changes across scenarios.
The U.S. maintains its import quota on processed sugar from Canada and dairy
19
manufactured goods from Canada; Mexico and Canada retain bilateral restrictions on each
others’ imports of dairy manufactured goods and poultry.
11
their effect on the price of domestic output.  Since we treat imports as imperfect substitutes for
domestic goods, we insulate the domestic price from the full effect of border price shocks. 
Tariffs and quotas raise the price of imports, increasing demand for the domestically produced
variety, and raising its price.  Since the producer price is a weighted average of the prices of
output sold on the domestic market and in each export market, it, too, will increase.  Tariffs are
measured as an ad valorem rate.  They increase the domestic price of the imported good relative
to its world price. 
In the model, we assume endogenous ad valorem tariff equivalents of quotas.  The initial
rates are calculated as the wedge between the world price and the domestic price, adjusted for
transport costs and any tariffs that are used in combination with the quota.  In the model, these
tariff equivalent rates adjust to maintain a specified level of imports.
Under NAFTA, import quotas are converted to tariff rate quotas (TRQ).  Under this
system, a specified volume of a commodity may enter at low or zero duty, and quantities above
that level are taxed at a higher rate.  In the model, TRQ rates are invoked endogenously when
imports exceed a specified quantity threshold (equation 8, table 5a).
For each country, net farm program expenditure is computed by summing government
expenditure and revenues arising from the various programs.  In the model, it is included in total
government fiscal expenditure and any increase in the net farm program expenditure will increase
the government budget deficit.
V.  Results
We simulate NAFTA under two regimes: First, we assume the farm programs which
restricted supply responses in the three countries remained in place when NAFTA was
implemented, at 1993 levels of program expenditure.  Next, we assume NAFTA occurs in an
environment with the reformed, largely nondistorting farm programs evident in all three countries
in 1997, at 1997 levels of program expenditure.   In both scenarios, we model NAFTA as the
18
removal of bilateral trade barriers among all three countries, with the exceptions of some sectors
as specified by the Agreement.   
19
In all three countries, NAFTA has a greater effect on agriculture under the new farm
programs than under pre-NAFTA farm programs.  Production changes by a bigger absolute12
amount in each country, with the biggest changes occurring in the U.S. and Mexico, countries
which insulated agriculture from price shocks with pre-NAFTA farm programs.  Under both old
and new programs, NAFTA has a greater impact on Mexican agriculture than on U.S. and
Canadian farm sectors, reflecting Mexico’s greater trade dependence on its North American
partners and higher pre-NAFTA trade barriers.
Another indication of NAFTA’s impact is the change in factor employment defined as 
the number of workers, acres of land, and value of capital stock initially employed in agriculture
that must find new employment, in agriculture or elsewhere, after changes in agricultural policies
(table 6).  In Mexico, employment effects of  NAFTA are substantially greater under the new
farm programs than the old – 1.2 percent of the agricultural labor force must find new
employment under old programs while 4.5% must change sectors under new programs. The
same pattern holds for the U.S., but the changes are less extreme with a 0.1 percent change in
labor employment under the old programs and a 0.2 percent change under the new programs.  In
Canada, labor adjustment to NAFTA is marginally greater under its new program than under its
pre-NAFTA farm support program (0.379 percent vs. 0.385 percent).   
Under both old and new farm programs, Mexico’s terms of trade decline because of
NAFTA.  Mexico’s import barriers were  higher than those of its North American partners,
causing Mexico’s imports to increase more than its exports as those barriers were lifted.  Some
analysts have cited the deterioration in Mexico’s terms of trade due to NAFTA as an argument
against regional trade agreements (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996).   We find that Mexico
experiences a welfare loss only when there are distorting domestic policies in place that prevent
an efficient reallocation of resources in response to trade reforms.  Similarly, in the U.S., the
flexibility introduced by farm program reform leads to larger welfare gains under NAFTA  (tables
7 and 8).  Under decoupled farm programs, resources can move more easily into sectors that
become more profitable under free trade and out of sectors that face import competition.  For
Mexico, the problem is exacerbated by the dramatic increase in farm program expenses under
free trade and distorting policies.  There is an  increase in lump sum taxes on  the consumer,
reducing welfare as real disposable income declined. 
Under both old and new programs, trade creation dominates trade diversion.  Trade
expansion (defined as the increase in total exports) is the highest for the U.S. and the lowest for
Mexico.  Furthermore, farm program reforms within NAFTA also benefit members’ trade with
nonmembers.  There is less absolute trade diversion for the U.S. and Canada and Mexico’s trade
with non-member countries increases more under new farm programs.  
 
At the sectoral level, output changes following NAFTA illustrate the interaction between
domestic and trade policies.  Under Mexico’s former, guaranteed price program, producers and
consumers faced fixed prices for corn.  Input subsidies to corn millers compensated them for
purchasing corn at the artificially high, guaranteed price.  To reduce the costs of its corn price
support program, Mexico restricted corn imports; the tariff equivalent of the quota was 90.4
percent in 1993.  With this program in place, corn milling production would have increasedIndeed, Mexico initiated its reform program, PROCAMPO, in October 1993, before
20
NAFTA went into effect.
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substantially under NAFTA to maintain the domestic price of corn which also faced downward
pressure from cheaper imported corn.  Mexican corn output would have risen slightly, despite
elimination of high trade barriers to corn.  To maintain its guaranteed price for corn under
NAFTA, Mexico’s farm program expenditures would have increased by 140 percent.  Such a
dramatic increase in program costs demonstrates why Mexico needed to restructure its farm
program support in a free trade environment.   
20
In contrast, without price supports for corn, Mexico’s corn production declines following
NAFTA as consumers substitute cheaper imported corn for the domestic variety.  Corn milling
output increases by a smaller amount as producers are responding only to cheaper imported corn,
not an increased subsidy to maintain demand for domestic corn.  Other agricultural sectors
benefit in Mexico. Fruit and vegetables expands more as resources are released from corn
production.  Likewise wheat does not contract as much.  This affects the U.S., whose wheat
exports to Mexico do not expand as much under NAFTA with the new programs compared to
under NAFTA with the old programs.
In the U.S., the interaction between domestic and trade policies is less dramatic than in
Mexico, because U.S. price support programs did not rely on tariffs to help support the domestic
price. The U.S. had endogenous deficiency payments to maintain fixed output prices for wheat,
corn, feedgrains, and oilseeds.  As in Mexico, these programs insulated producers from increased
competition due to NAFTA.  However, for the U.S., NAFTA increased demand for crops
formerly supported with deficiency payments, particularly corn and wheat.  In the scenario with




Mexico, when it considered joining NAFTA, had characteristics typical of a small
developing country: (1) relatively high tariffs; (2) a high trade dependency on its RTA partner;
and (3) extensive domestic distortions in agriculture.  According to some theoretical models, its
relatively high tariffs and trade dependence meant welfare losses under NAFTA.  We find that
domestic distortions contribute to net welfare losses because they insulate agriculture and prevent
the efficient reallocation of domestic resources in response to changing market signals.  They also
require a lump sum tax increase on consumers in order to maintain high farm prices when
borders are opened.  However, when domestic reforms accompany NAFTA, Mexico experiencesThis is in contrast to Panagariya (1997), who does not consider domestic distortions
21
when he calculates the welfare losses of NAFTA for Mexico.  Instead, he bases his analysis on
the tariff revenue lost and trade diversion with no trade creation.
14
a welfare gain from the RTA.   While Mexico still experiences terms of trade losses, its larger
21
efficiency gains now lead to a net welfare gain under NAFTA.  Furthermore, we find that trade
creation dominates trade diversion with and without domestic policy reforms.  There is greater
trade expansion when domestic distortions are removed.  
Similar to Mexico, many developing countries maintain distorting domestic farm
programs  whose effectiveness depends on trade restrictions. We find that high trade
dependencies and high tariffs — other characteristics of developing countries — create pressure
for domestic reform following the formation of an RTA.  Given the current emphasis on reducing
distortions in agriculture in the Uruguay round and future multilateral negotiations, our results
suggest that an RTA can be a building bloc, not a stumbling bloc, to multilateralism.
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Table 1 — Trade dependencies among NAFTA countries, 1993
Imports from partner (as a percent of total) Exports to partner (as a percent of total)
U.S. Canada Mexico Rest of World U.S. Canada Mexico Rest of World
United States
  Total 17.40 5.11 77.48 17.61 7.44 74.95
  Agriculture 44.87 32.70 22.43 16.52 7.11 76.37
Canada
  Total 70.93 0.91 28.16 78.58 0.53 20.89
  Agriculture 75.54 1.16 23.30 39.52 2.13 58.35
Mexico
  Total 79.88 1.38 18.74 81.23 3.25 15.52
 Agriculture 61.02 5.70 33.29 94.21 2.65 3.1419
Table 2 — Tariff and tariff equivalent of quota rates, 1993
U.S. Canada Mexico
Poultry        0.49 0.30 10.58
Livestock           0.82 0.56 15.00
Wheat         2.47 0.00 67.00
Corn            0.15 0.23 90.38
Feed grain      0.15 0.00 9.07
Fruits & vegetables     4.55 0.95 16.30
Oilseeds        0.00 0.00 7.30
Other agriculture  1.60 0.64 8.79
Forestry & fisheries 0.26 0.47 11.78
Meat         9.60 3.04 19.70
Dairy manufacturing   6.78 12.30 89.60
Sugar manufacturing 70.40 4.93 15.00
Prepared fruits & vegetables 5.26 7.00 20.00
Wheat milling    1.06 2.84 17.41
Feed milling 0.10 1.43 8.64
Corn milling  0.50 2.84 11.07
Oil milling   1.08 7.10 20.10
Miscellaneous food processing 5.50 9.30 30.10
Light manufacturing    8.96 3.44 9.76
Oil 0.55 0.08 5.79
Intermediates             4.06 0.60 6.04
Fertilizer 3.51 1.84 8.02
Consumer durables    2.42 1.78 9.12
Capital goods            2.56 1.46 7.81
Services 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade weighted average 2.92 1.91 7.91
Source: World Trade Organization, tariff data base; various Attache Reports, Foreign Agricultural
Service, USDA; tariff equivalent of quotas are calculated by authors from PSE data, and International
Trade Commission (1990).   Import quotas converted to tariff rate quotas in 1995. 20
Table 3 — Producer incentive equivalent of agricultural distortions, 1993
U.S Canada Mexico
1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997
subsidy rate per unit of output
Poultry 0.21 0.00 0.32 0.10 7.30 1.37
Livestock 0.45 0.00 0.25 0.56 3.59 0.64
Wheat 14.09 3.55 0.43 0.52 2.68 1.29
Corn 6.11 0.65 0.18 0.09 2.56 1.05
Feedgrain 17.96 2.08 0.11 0.24 2.15 1.94
Oilseeds 2.18 0.96 0.17 0.16 2.67 0.37
Other agriculture 7.54 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05
Meat manufacturing 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dairy manufacturing 0.01 0.30 2.65 0.06 5.84 5.12
Sugar manufacturing 0.67 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.14 0.35
Wheat milling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.78 0.00
Feed milling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.21 0.00
Corn milling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.56 12.15
Note: Producer incentive equivalent refers to subsidy expenditure relative to producer price.  
Source: OECD, “Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents,” electronic data base, 1998.21
Table 4 — How policies are modeled
         Countries and sectors                       Impact                  Instrument
Endogenous Exogenous
Deficiency Payments U.S. : wheat, corn, feed grain & other PVA, value added price DEFPAY
agriculture
Input subsidies Mexico: livestock, wheat, corn, feed PVA, value added price insub
grain, oil seeds, other agriculture & dairy
manufacturing
Canada: poultry, livestock, wheat,
corn, feed grain, oil seeds, & dairy
manufacturing
Guaranteed price  Mexico: corn prices are fixed, subsidy to PX, output price for  the sector in which PSUBU, per                         
corn millers prices are guaranteed & PVA, value added unit subsidy to         
price in the sector which uses the fixed the processor
price commodity as an input
Tariff rate quotas  U.S.: sugar and dairy manufacturing PWM, world import price TRQ
against Canada and Rest of World
Mexico: dairy manufacturing and poultry
against Canada
Tariffs U.S.: all sectors PWM, world import price tm
Mexico: all sectors
Canada: all sectors           Countries and sectors                       Impact                  Instrument
Endogenous Exogenous
22
Quotas U.S.: sugar manufacturing, dairy PWM, world import price TM2
manufacturing, & meat (treated as
exogenous in base model and eliminated
for partner countries in NAFTA)
Mexico: wheat, corn, & dairy
manufacturing (treated as exogenous in
base model and eliminated for partner
countries in NAFTA)
Indirect taxes U.S.: all sectors PD, domestic sales price itax
Canada: all sectors except prepared fruits
and vegetables
Value added tax Mexico: all sectors PVA, value added price vatr,
Export subsidies Canada: wheat, feed grain and oilseeds PE, domestic export price te0
Supply management Canada: livestock & poultry X, output level is constant SCALE,
payment to
value added
Price management Canada: dairy manufacturing PX, output price is constant TE, export
subsidy
Crop and revenue Canada: grains and oilseeds PVA, value added price ins
insurance U.S.: grains and oilseeds




% insubi,k % PSUBUi,k
DEFPAYi,k ’ ¯ XPi,k@( ¯ TPi,k & PXi,k)
PMi,k,cty1 ’ PWMi,k,cty1@EXRk@
(1 % tmi,k,cty1 % TM2i,k,cty1 % TRQi,k,cty1)
TARIFFk,cty1 ’ ji tmi,k,cty1@Mi,k,cty1@PWMi,k,cty1@EXRk %
ji TRQi,k,cty1@(Mi,k,cty1 & M0i,k,cty1)@PWMi,k,cty1@EXRk
Xi,k # ¯ Xi,k SCALEI,K # 1
PXi,k $ ¯ PXi,k TEi,k $ 0
Mi,k,cty1 # ¯ Mi,k,cty1 TRQi,k,cty1 $ 0
EXPSUBk ’ ji,cty1 (te0i,k,cty1 % TEi,k,cty1)@
PWEi,k,cty1@Ei,k,cty1@EXRk
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Table 5a — Policy equations    
# Equation Comple- Description
mentarity 
constraint













8 Tariff rate quota
9 Export subsidy
Note: the subscripts i refers to sectors; k refers to NAFTA countries; and cty1 refers to NAFTA countries and the
rest of the world; a bar over a variable indicates a fixed level of that variable.24
Table 5b — Model variables
DEFPAY  Deficiency payment by sector i,k
E Exports of good i from country k to country cty1 i,k,cty1 
EXPSUB Export subsidy paid by country k k
EXR    Exchange rate by country  k
IO  Input output table: amount of good i used to make one unit of good j, by country i,j,k
M  Imports of good i in country k, from country cty1 i,k,cty1
PIE  Producer incentive equivalent of price support programs for good i, in country k; i,k
measured per unit of output
PREM  Quota rents for good i in country k i,k
PVA  Value added price of good i in country k i,k
PWE World price of exports from country cty1 in country k for good i i,k,cty1
PWM  World price of imports from country cty1 in country k for good i i,k,cty1
PX  Output price of good i in country k i,k
SCALE  Constraint on marginal factor productivity in production of good i in country k i,k
TE  Export subsidy on good i from country k to country cty1, to maintain price of i,k,cty1
commodity i in country k (price management policy)
TM2   Tariff equivalent of the quota on imports of good i from country cty1, in country k  i,k,cty1
TP  Target output price of good i in country k i,k
TRQ  Tariff rate quotas on country k’s imports of good i from country cty1, i,k,cty1
X  Output of good i in country k i,k
Parameters
insub Input subsidy per unit of output of good i in country k i,k
te0 Export subsidy per unit of export on good i from country k to country cty1 i,k,cty1
tm Tariff rate per unit of import on country k’s import of good i from country cty1 i,k,ct25
Table 6 —  Factor market adjustment following NAFTA (percent change)














Note: Percent change in factor employment refers to number of workers, land, or capital that
leave any farm sector due to NAFTA, relative to base level of agricultural employment.  They
may be reemployed in other farm or nonfarm sectors. 26
Table 7 – Aggregate results, NAFTA and 1993 policies
 Real GDP       Real Absorption   Farm Program Expenditure Terms of Trade
percent change from base
U.S. 0.01 0.01 -0.49 0.56
Canada 0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.37
Mexico 0.03 -0.11 140.21 -0.92




U.S. 5.80 6.27 -0.47 0.34
Canada 2.29 5.67 -3.37 0.57
Mexico 0.81 0.41 0.40 -1.02
Welfare is calculated as equivalent variation; in the format reported here, a positive number is a welfare gain.
a 
Trade expansion is defined as the increase in exports from the base for each country; trade creation is the increase
b 
in exports to countries in NAFTA; trade diversion is the change in exports to countries outside NAFTA (the rest of
world).
   27
Table 8 – Aggregate results, NAFTA and 1997 policies
Real GDP Real Absorption Farm Program Terms of Trade
Expenditure
percent change from base
U.S. 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.58
Canada 0.01 0.11 -0.25 0.37
Mexico 0.26 0.10 -0.42 -1.03
Trade Expansion  Trade Creation Trade Diversion Welfare
b
billion U.S. dollars
U.S. 5.84 6.47 -0.63 0.43
Canada 2.30 5.67 -3.37 0.57
Mexico 0.90 0.42 0.48 0.34
Welfare is calculated as equivalent variation; in the format reported here, a positive number is a welfare gain.
a 
Trade expansion is defined as the increase in exports from the base for each country; trade creation is the increase
b 
in exports to countries in NAFTA; trade diversion is the change in exports to countries outside NAFTA (the rest of
world).





GAMS is suiitable for solving linear, non-linear, or mixed integer programming
22
problems as well.  For a thorough introduction to model-building in GAMS, see Brooke,
Kendrick, and Meeraus (1988).
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Appendix: Structure of the NAFTA-CGE Model
Solving the CGE Model
The CGE model presented here has been developed and solved using a package called the
General Algebraic Modeling System (or GAMS).    GAMS is designed to make complex
22
mathematical models easier to construct and understand.  We use it to solve a large, fully
determined, non-linear CGE model in which the number of equations equals the number of
variables.  GAMS has become a powerful tool for modelers because of two related developments
of the last several years.  First, the increasing power and availability of personal computers allows
every modeler to have desktop access to computational resources that were once available only
on mainframe computers.  Second, the development of packaged software such as GAMS,  to
solve complex mathematical or statistical problems has permitted modelers to return their
attention to economics.  
To a great extent, the GAMS representation of model equations is easily read as standard
algebraic notation.  Subscripts indicating countries, sectors, or factors appear in parentheses [Xij
becomes X(i,j)], and a few special symbols are used to indicate algebraic operations [Ó becomes
SUM, Ð becomes PROD].  For example, the Cobb-Douglas consumer price index equation:
is represented in GAMS as:
PINDCON  =  PROD(i, PQ(i)**pwtc(i,k)) 
where PROD stands for the product operator Ð, the i at the left of the parenthetic expression is
the sectoral index over which summation occurs, and the two asterisks (**) indicate
exponentiation.
The “$” introduces a conditional “if” statement in an algebraic statement.  For example,
PM(i,k,cty1)$imi(i,k,cty1) = xxx will carry out the expression shown for all PM(i,k,cty1) that
belong to the set imi(i,k,cty1); in other words, calculate an import price for all sectors in which
there are imports.  
Tables 1 and 2 list the regional, sectoral, and factor classifications used in the model, as
well as identifying the sectoral subsets that are needed in the equations of the model.  Table 3
contains the parameter definitions used in the CGE model equations.  Table 4 contains the
variables that appear in the model. 29
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
CTY1,CTY2 Universe US United States
                                               CA Canada
MX   Mexico
RT        Rest of World
K(cty1), L(cty1)  Countries US United States
                                               CA Canada
MX   Mexico
SECTORS AND GROUPINGS





FRTVEG Fruits & Vegetables
OILSEED Oilseeds
OTHAG Other Agriculture


















ik(i) Capital and intermediates (OL, INT, KG)
oil(i) Oil sector (OL)
noil(i) Non-oil sectors
iag(i) Agricultural sectors (POULTRY, LVSTK, WHEAT, CORN, FEEDGRN, FRTVEG, OILSEED, OTHAG) 
iagn(i) Non-agricultural sectors
ipr(i) Processing sectors (MEAT, DAIRYMFG, SUGARMFG, FVPREPS, WHTMILL, FEEDMILL, CORNMILL, OILMILL,
MISCFOOD)





imi(i,k,cty1) Bilateral imports in base data
iei(i,k,cty1) Bilateral exports in base data
ie1(i,k) Aggregate CET export sectors
ie2(i,k) Competitive export sectors (WHEAT.CA, WHEAT.US)
iec(i,k) Sectors with second-level export CET (All sectors in this version of the model)
iecn(i,k) Sectors with second-level competitive sectors
ied(i,k) Sectors with export demand from RT
iedn(i,k) Not ied (All sectors in this version of the model)
iedw(i,k) Setors with export RT-demand belonging to an aggregate curve
isnap(i,k,cty1) Sectors with snap-back provisions (SUGARMFG.US.CA, SUGARMFG.US.RT, DAIRYMFG.US.CA, DAIRMFG.US.RT,
DIARYMFG.MX.CA, POULTRY.MX.CA)
SMGMT(i,k) Sectors with supply management (LVSTK.CA, POULTRY.CA) 
NSMGMT(i,k) Non-supply management sectors
PMGMT(i,k) Price management sectors (DAIRYMFG.CA)
NPMGMT(i,k) Non-price management sectors
DPAY(i,k) Endogenous deficiency payment sectors (WHEAT.US, CORN.US, FEEDGRN.US, OTHAG.US)
NDPAY(i,k) Non-deficiency payment sectors
FXP(i,k) Fixed price sectors (CORN.MX)
PS(i,k) Producer Subsidy Sectors (CORNMILL.MX)
NPS(i,k) Non-Producer Subsidy sectors
Table 1: Regional and Sectoral in the NAFTA-CGE Model30
FACTORS AND GROUPINGS
iff,f Factors of production RULAB Rural labor
URBUNLAB Urban unskilled labor




LA(iff), LB(iff) Labor categories RULAB Rural labor
URBUNLAB Urban unskilled labor
UNIONLAB Urban skilled labor
YUPS Professional labor
LC Land categories LAND1 Irrigated land (MX) or land for grains & oilseeds (US&CA)
LAND2 Non-irrigated land (MX) or land for non-grains and non-
oilseeds (US&CA)
IFF2(iff) Non-nested inputs RULAB Rural labor
URBUNLAB Urban unskilled labor
UNIONLAB Urban skilled labor
YUPS Professional labor
CAPITAL Capital




imigrl(la, k,l) Labor mobility map (within category)
imigru(k,la,lb) Labor mobility map (across category) (MX.URBUNLAB.RULAB)
imigk(k,l) Capital mobility map
lmig(la,k) Mobile labor factors (within category)
rmig(la,k) Mobil labor factors (across category)
kmig(k) Countries with mobile capital
HOUSEHOLDS AND INSTITUTIONS
hh Households HHALL Single household category
ins Institutions LABR Labor
ENT Enterprises
PROP Property income
Table 2: Factor and Income Classifications in the NAFTA-CGE Model31
Model Parameters
CLES(i,hh,k)        Household consumption shares
ENTR(k)             Enterprise income tax rate
GLES(i,k)           Government expenditure shares
HHTR(hh,k)          Household income tax rate
IO(i,j,k)           Input-output coefficients
ITAX(i,k)           Indirect tax rates
MPS(hh,k) Savings propensities by households
PVAB0(i,k) Base-year value added price
PWTC(i,k)           Consumer price index weights (PQ)
PWTS(i,k) Consumer price index weights (PD)
PWTX(i,k) Consumer price index weights (PX)
SPREM(i,k)           Share of premium revenue to the government
SSTR(iff,k) Factor payment tax rates
TC(i,k) Consumption tax rates
TE0(i,k)             Tax rates on exports
THSH(hh,k)          Household transfer income shares
TM(i,k,cty1)        Tariff rates on imports
TMREAL(i,k,cty1) Real tariff rates on imports for real GDP calculations
VATR(i,k)           Value added tax rate
XP0(i,k) Initial quantity of output under deficiency payments program
ZSHR(i,k)           Investment demand shares
Production and trade function parameters
AC(i,k) Armington function shift parameter
AD(i,k) Cobb-Douglas production function shift parameter
AD2(i,k) CES production function shift parameter
AE(i,k)             CET export composition function shift parameter 
ALPHA(i,iff,k) Cobb-Douglas factor share parameter
ALPHA2(i,iff,k) CES factor share parameter
AT(i,k)             CET function shift parameter
DELTA(i,k,cty1) Armington function share parameter
GAMMA(i,k,cty1)  CET export composition function share parameters
GAMMAK(i,k)       CET function share parameter
RHOE(i,k)  CET export composition function exponent
RHOP(i,k) CES production function exponent
RHOT(i,k)           CET function exponent
Nested land function parameters
ALC(i,k) CES land composite function shift parameter
ALPHALC(i,lc,k) CES land share parameter
RHOL(I,K) CES land aggregate exponent
SIGMALC(i,k) Elasticity of substitution in land composite
Parameters for farm programs
DIRPAY(k) Direct payments
INSUB(i,k) Input subsidy rate per unit of output
Parameters for AIDS import demand functions
AMQ(i,k,cty1)          Share parameter in AIDS function
AQ(i,k)                   Constant in translog price index 
AQS(i,k)                  Constant in Stone price index
BETAQ(i,k,cty1)     Coefficient in AIDS function
ELASTPQ(i,k,cty1) Translog own price elasticity of dmeand
ELASTPQ2(i,k,cty1) Stone own price elasticity of demand
ELASTSQ(i,k,cty1,cty2) Translog elasticity of substitution
ELASTSQ2(i,k,cty1,cty2) Stone elasticity of substutition
GAMMAQ(i,k,cty1,cty2)     Price parameter in AIDS function
SMQ0(i,k,cty1)   Base year import value share
SUMYQ(i,k) Weighted sum of income elasticities





PDA(i,k) Domestic prices net of indirect taxes
PE(i,k,cty1) Domestic price of exports
PEK(i,k) Average domestic price of exports
PINDCON(k) Consumer price index
PINDEX(k) Output price index
PINDOM(k) Domestic price index
PM(i,k,CTY1) Domestic price of imported goods
PQ(i,k) Price of composite goods
PREM(i,k) Premium income from import rationing
PVA(i,k) Value added price including subsidies
PVAB(i,k) Value added price net of subsidies
PWE(i,cty1,cty2) World price of exports
PWERAT(i,k)  Ratio of world export prices
PWEFX(i) Benchmark world export price
PWM(i,cty1,cty2) World price of imports
PX(i,k) Average output price
TE(i,k) Export subsidies
TM2(i,k,cty1) Import premium rates
TM3(i,k,cty1) Snapback tariffs
Production block
D(i,k) Domestic sales of domestic output
E(i,cty1,cty2) Bilateral exports
EK(i,k) Aggregate sectoral exportss
INT(i,k) Intermediate demand
M(i,cty1,cty2) Bilateral imports
Q(i,k) Composite goods supply
SCALE(i,k) Output multiplier




AGDIST(k) Adjustment to restrict agricultural
capital
AVWF(iff,k) Average wage with current weights
FDSC(i,iff,k) Factor demand by sector
FS(iff,k) Factor supply
FSAG(k) Agricultural capital stock
FT(k) Factor tax rate




LFDSC(i.lc,k) Land demand by sector
FSL(lc,k) Land supply




FPE(k) Total farm program expenditures
PIE(i,k) Producer incentive equivalent
PSUBU(i,k) Producer subsidy rate
TP(i,k) Target price
Migration block
MIGK(K) Capital migration flows
MIGL(la,k) Labor migration flows (within category)
MIGRU(la,k) Labor migration flows (across category)
WGDFL(la,k,lb,l) Wage differentials
WGDFK(k,l) Rental differentials
Income and expenditure block
CDD(i,k) Private consumption demand
DST(i,k) Inventory investment demand
ENTSAV(k) Enterprise savings
ENTAX(k) Enterprise taxes
ENTT(k)  Government transfers to enterprises
ESR(k) Enterprise savings rate
EXPSUB(k) Export subsidy payment
FBAL(K) Current account balance
FBOR(k) Foreign borrowing by government
FKAP(k) Foreign capital flow to enterprises
FSAV(k,cty1) Bilateral net foreign savings
FSAVE(k)Foreign savings
FTAX(k) Factor taxes
GD(i,k) Government demand by sector
GDPVA(k) Nominal expenditure GDP
GDTOT(k) Government real consumption
GOVSAV(k) Government savings
GOVREV(k) Government revenue
HHT(k) Government transfer to households
HSAV(k) Aggregate household savings
HTAX(k) Household taxes
ID(i,k) Investment demand (by sector of origin)
INDTAX(k) Indirect tax revenue




VATAX(k) Value added taxes
YH(hh,k) Household income
YINST(ins,k) Institutional income
ZFIX(k) Fixed aggregate real investment
ZTOT(k) Aggregate nominal investment
Welfare
CDH(i,hh,k) Consumption by household and
commodity
UTIL(hh,k) Utility by household
EV(hh,k) Equivalent variation
YN(hh,k) New spending on consumer goods for EV
calculation
Table 4: Variables in the NAFTA CGE modelFor Mexico, each farm product can be produced using irrigated and non-irrigated land. 
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For the U.S. and Canada, land is restricted to two subsets of farm sectors:   grains and oilseeds
use one type of land while all other agricultural sectors use another type of land.  
33
(1) X(i,k) =AD2(i,k)* ( SUM(iff$FDSC0(i,iff,k),
 ALPHA2(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k)**(-RHOP(i,k))) )**(-1/RHOP(i,k)) ;
(2) (1-ft(i,iff2,k))*WF(iff,k)*WFDIST(i,iff,k) =   
SCALE(i,k)*(1 - vatr(i,k))*pva(i,k)*AD2(i,k)
*( SUM(f$FDSC0(i,f,k), ALPHA2(i,f,k)*FDSC(i,f,k)**(-RHOP(i,k)))  )
  **((-1/RHOP(i,k)) - 1)*ALPHA2(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k)**(-RHOP(i,k)-1);
(3) FDSC(i,"land",k) =E= ALC(i,k)*( SUM(lc$LFDSC0(i,lc,k),
          ALPHALC(i,lc,k)*LFDSC(i,lc,k)**(-RHOL(i,k))) )**(-1/RHOL(i,k)) ;
          
(4) WLC(lc,k)*WLDIST(i,lc,k) =
              SCALE(i,k)*(1 - vatr(i,k))*PVA(i,k)*SAD(i,k)*SAD2(i,k)*AD2(i,k)*
              (SUM(f$FDSC0(i,f,k), ALPHA2(i,f,k)*FDSC(i,f,k)**
              (-RHOP(i,k))) )**((-1/RHOP(i,k)) - 1)*
              ALPHA2(i,"land",k)*FDSC(i,"land",k)**(-RHOP(i,k) -1)*
              ALC(i,k)*(SUM(sct$LFDSC0(i,sct,k), ALPHALC(i,sct,k)*LFDSC(i,sct,k)
              **(-RHOL(i,k)) ) )**((-1/RHOL(i,k)) -1)*ALPHALC(i,lc,k)
              *LFDSC(i,lc,k)**(-RHOL(i,k) -1) ;
(5)  WFDIST(iag,"capital",k) = AGDIST(k)*WFDIST0(iag,"capital",k) ;               
                 
(6) INT(i,k)  = SUM(j, IO(i,j,k)*X(j,k));
                   
Table 5: Quantity Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
Model Specification
There are 26 sectors for each country in the model; to focus on agricultural policies and
trade, there are 9 farm sectors and 10 food processing sectors in the model.  There are eight
factors of production – rural labor, urban unskilled labor, urban skilled labor, professional labor,
irrigated and non-irrigated land, agricultural capital and capital used in other sectors.  The output-
supply and input-demand equations are shown in Table 5.  Output is produced according to a
constant elasticity of substitution, CES, production function of the primary factors (equation 1),
with intermediate inputs demanded in fixed proportions (equation6). There is a CES aggregation
of irrigated and non-irrigated land (equation 3).   Producers are assumed to maximize profits,
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implying that each factor is demanded such that marginal product equals marginal cost (equation
2 for all factors except land and equation 4 for land types).  In each economy, factors are not
assumed to receive a uniform wage or “rental” (in the case of capital) across sectors.  “Factor
market distortion” parameters (the WFDIST (WLDIST) that appears in equation 2 (equation 4))
are imposted that fix the ratio of the sectoral return to a factor relative to the economy-wide
average return for that factor. Agricultural capital is restricted to farm sectors.  Rather than create
two types of capital inputs, we introduce the variable, AGDIST(k) which allows the payment to
agricultural capital to adjust to  meet the constraint that the supply of agricultural capital is34
(7) PM(i,k,cty1) =  PWM(i,k,cty1)*EXR(k) *(1 + TM(i,k,cty1) + TM2(i,k,cty1) + TM3(i,k,cty1) ) ;
(8) PE(iei,k,cty1) = PWE(iei,k,cty1)* (1 + te0(iei,k) + TE(iei,k))*EXR(k) ;
               
(9) PE(ie2,k,cty1) = PD(i,k);
(10)  PWE(i,cty1,cty2) =E= PWM(i,cty2,cty1) ;
(11) PEK(i,k) * EK(i,k) =E= SUM(cty1$pt(k,cty1), PE(i,k,cty1) * E(i,k,cty1) ) ;
                                  
(12) PDA(i,k) =E= (1-itax(i,k))*PD(i,k) ;
(13) PQ(i,k)*Q(i,k) =E= PD(i,k)*D(i,k) +SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1), (PM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1))) ;
                
(14) PX(i,k)*X(i,k) =E= PDA(i,k)*D(i,k) +SUM(cty1$iei(i,k,cty1), (PE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1))) ;
               
(15) PINDCON(k) =E= PROD(i$pwtc(i,k), PQ(i,k)**pwtc(i,k)) ;
(16) PVA(i,k) =E= PX(i,k) - SUM(j,IO(j,i,k)*PQ(j,k)) + PIE(i,k);
(17)  PVAB(i,k) =E= (1.0-ITAX(i,k))*PD(i,k)*D(i,k)/X(i,k)+ (SUM(cty1, PE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1) ))/X(i,k)-
SUM(j,IO(j,i,k)*PQ(j,k)) ;
                         
Table 6: Price Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
constant.  Adjustment to agricultural capital payments appear in equation 5 in which payment to
agricultural capital by sector (defined for the agricultural sectors, iag), is adjusted by the
endogenous AGDIST(k).
The price equations are shown in Table 6.  In equations 7 and 8, world prices are
converted into domestic currency, including any tax or tariff components.  Equation 9 describes
the export price when domestic and export goods are perfect substitutes.  Equation 10 
guarantees cross-trade price consistency, so that the world price of country A’s exports to
country B are the same as the world price of country B’s imports from country A.  Equation 11 
defines the aggregate export price as the weighted sum of the export price to each destination. 
Equation 12  calculates the domestic price, net of indirect tax.  Equations 13 and 14 describe the
prices for the composite commodities Q and X.  Q represents the aggregation of sectoral imports
(M) and domestic goods supplied to the domestic market (D).  X is total sectoral output, which is
a CET aggregation of total supply to export markets (E) and goods sold on the domestic market
(D).  The consumer price index, a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of consumer prices, appears in
equation 15.  Equation 16 defines the sectoral price of value added, or “net” price (PVA) as the
output price (PX) minus the unit cost of intermediate inputs (from the input-output coefficients),
plus production incentives from exogenous agricultural producer subsidy schemes (PIE).
Equation 17 describes the value added price net of indirect taxes which are taken out of domestic
sales (PD*D).35
(18) YFCTR(iff2,k) =SUM(i, (1-ft(k))*WF(iff2,k)*WFDIST(i,iff2,k)*FDSC(i,iff2,k));
(19)  YFCTR("land",k) =E= SUM((i,lc), WLC(lc,k)*WLDIST(i,lc,k)*LFDSC(i,lc,k) );
(20)  YINST("labr",k) = SUM(la, (1.0 - sstr(la,k))*YFCTR(la,k)) ;
(21)  YINST("ent",k)  = YFCTR(“capital”,k)*(1.0-sstr(“capital”,k)) + EXR(k)*FKAP(k) - ENTSAV(k) - ENTAX(k) + ENTT(k)
                  + SUM(i, (1-sprem(i,k))*PREM(i,k))  - SUM(i, (SCALE(i,k)-1)*X(i,k)*(1 - vatr(i,k))*PVA(i,k)) ;
                              
(22) YINST("prop",k) = YFCTR("land",k)*(1.0 - sstr("land",k)) ;
                                   
(23)  YH(hh,k)  = SUM(ins, sintyh(hh,ins,k)*YINST(ins,k))+ rhsh(hh,k)*EXR(k)*REMIT(k)+ HHT(k)*thsh(hh,k) +DIRPAY(k); 
                            
(24)  TARIFF(k,cty1) = SUM(i$imi(i,k,cty1), TM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1)*PWM(i,k,cty1))*EXR(k) 
+SUM(i, TM3(i,k,cty1)*(M(i,k,cty1) - M0(i,k,cty1))*PWM(i,k,cty1))*EXR(k);
                              
(25) PREM(i,k) = SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1), TM2(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1)*PWM(i,k,cty1))*EXR(k) ;
(26)  EXPSUB(k) = SUM((i,cty1), (te0(i,k) + TE(i,k))*PWE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1)*EXR(k)) ;
(27)  INDTAX(k) =SUM(i, itax(i,k)*PD(i,k)*D(i,k)) ;
(28) VATAX(k)  = SUM(i, vatr(i,k)*PVA(i,k)*X(i,k)) ;
(29)  ENTAX(k)  = ENTR(k)*(YFCTR(“capital”,k) + ENTT(k)) ;
(30) SSTAX(k)  = SUM(iff, sstr(iff,k)*YFCTR(iff,k));
(31) HTAX(k)   = SUM(hh, hhtr(hh,k)*YH(hh,k)) ;
(32)  FTAX(k)   = SUM((iff2,i), ft(k)*WF(iff2,k)*WFDIST(i,iff2,k)*FDSC(i,iff2,k)) ;
                                     
(33) GOVREV(k) = SUM(cty1, TARIFF(k,cty1)) + INDTAX(k) - EXPSUB(k)+ SUM(i, sprem(i,k)*PREM(i,k))
                  + FTAX(k) + SSTAX(k) + HTAX(k) + ENTAX(k) + VATAX(k) + FBOR(k)*EXR(k);
                                                   
(34) GOVSAV(k) = GOVREV(k) - SUM(i, GD(i,k)*PQ(i,k)) - HHT(k )- ENTT(k) - FPE(k) ;
                             
(35)  HSAV(k)   = SUM(hh, mps(hh,k)*((1.0-hhtr(hh,k))*YH(hh,k)));
                             
(36) ENTSAV(k) = esr(k)*YFCTR(“capital”,k) ;
(37) FSAVE(k) = FBAL(k)-FKAP(k)-FBOR(k)-REMIT(k) ;
(38) ZTOT(k) = GOVSAV(k) + HSAV(k) + ENTSAV(k) + EXR(k) * FSAVE(k);
(39) ZTOT(k) = SUM(i, PQ(i,k)*(ID(i,k)+DST(i,k))) + WALRAS2(k) ;
(40) PQ(i,k)*CDD(i,k) = SUM(hh, CLES(i,hh,k)*YH(hh,k)*(1.0-hhtr(hh,k))*(1.0-mps(hh,k)));
(41) GD(i,k) = gles(i,k)*GDTOT(k) ;
(42) ID(i,k) = zshr(i,k)*ZFIX(k) ;
(43)  GDPY(k)..    GDPVA(k) =E= SUM(i, PVAB(i,k)*X(i,k) + PREM(i,k)) + INDTAX(k) + SUM(cty1, TARIFF(k,cty1)) ;
                     
(44)  GDPR(k)..    RGDP(k) =E= SUM(i, var0(i,k)*X(i,k)) ;
TABLE 7: Income and Expenditure Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model36
In the NAFTA CGE model, the aggregate consumer price index in each region is set
exogenously (PINDCON in equation 15), defining the numeraire. The advantage of this choice is
that solution wages and incomes are in real terms.  The solution exchange rates in the sub-regions
are also in real terms, and can be seen as equilibrium price-level-deflated (PLD) exchange rates,
using the country consumer price indices as deflators.  The exchange rate for the Rest of the
World (rt)  is fixed, thereby defining the international numeraire.
The circular flow of income from producers, through factor payments, to households,
government, and investors, and finally back to demand for goods in product markets is shown in
the equations in Table 7.  Equations 18 - 23 describe the payment to factors, institutions, and
households in the model.  
The country models incorporate official tariff revenue (TARIFF in equation 24) which
flows to the government, and the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers (PREM in equation 25)
which is allocated as rents to the private sector and income to the government (the share
parameter SPREM defines the share of premium income which accrues to the government).  The
country models also allow for export subsidies by commodity (the same rate applies to each
trade partner, in contrast to the tariff rates which can vary by partner).  There are two types of
export subsidies, one which is exogenous in the base data, te0(i,k) and one which is endogenous
and is used as part of the price management policy – when there is pressure for the price of a
good to fall below the price floor, the export subsidy turns on to support the price.
Each economy is modeled as having a number of domestic market distortions, including
sectorally differentiated indirect and value-added taxes (equations 27 and 28)  as well as factor,
household, and corporate income taxes (equations 29-32). Taxes accrue to the government as
revenue (equation 33).  The government spends its revenue on goods and services, transfer
payments and production subsidies (equation 34).  The remainder is government savings.  Other
forms of savings are described in equations 35 - 38.  Total savings equals expenditure on
investment goods, equation 39.  The single household category in each economy has a Cobb-
Douglas expenditure function (equation 40).  Real investment and government consumption are
set in equations 41 and 42.  GDP from value added is described in equation 43 and real GDP is
described in equation 44.When exports and domestic goods are perfect substitutes (as defined over commodities
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in the set ie2), equation 46 describes the allocation of production between domestic and exported
goods.  When exports are zero (as defined over the commodities ien) all production goes to
domestic sales, equation 47.
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(45) X(i,k) = AT(i,k)*( GAMMAK(i,k) *EK(i,k)**(-RHOT(i,k))+ (1 - GAMMAK(i,k)) *D(i,k) **(-RHOT(i,k)))**(-1/RHOT(i,k)) ;
(46) X(ie2,k) = D(ie2,k) + EK(ie2,k) ;
(47) X(ien,k) =D(ien,k) ; 
(48)  EK(i,k) = D(i,k)*(PDA(i,k)/PEK(i,k)*GAMMAK(i,k)/(1 - GAMMAK(i,k)))**(1/(1+RHOT(i,k))) ;
                
(49) E(iec,k,cty1) = EK(iec,k) * (((GAMMA(iec,k,cty1)*PEK(iec,k)) /(AE(iec,k)**RHOE(iec,k) * PE(iec,k,cty1)))
**(1/(1+RHOE(iec,k))))  ;
                 
(50) PE(iecn,k,cty1) = PEK(iecn,k) ;
(51)   E(ied,k,"rt") = EB(ied,k)*(PWE(ied,k,"rt")/PWEB(ied,k))**(-etae(ied,k)) ;
                     
(52) M(i,cty1,cty2)  = E(i,cty2,cty1) ;
TABLE 8: Export Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
(53) Q(i,k) =  AC(i,k)*(SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1),  DELTA(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1) **(-RHOC(i,k))) + (1- SUM(cty1$PT(k,cty1),
     DELTA(i,k,cty1)))*D(i,k) **(-RHOC(i,k)))**(-1/RHOC(i,k) ;
       
(54)  Q(imn,k) =  D(imn,k) ;
(55)  M(i,k,cty1)/D(i,k) = (PD(i,k)/PM(i,k,cty1)*DELTA(i,k,cty1)/(1 - SUM(cty2$PT(k,cty2),
DELTA(i,k,cty2))))**(1/(1+RHOC(i,k))) ;                   
TABLE 9: Armington Import Demand Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
  Export-related functions are shown in Table 8.  Exports are supplied according to a CET
function between domestic sales and exports (equation 45).  Allocation between export and
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domestic markets occurs in order to maximize revenue from total sales (equation 48).  There is a
nested CET function to allocate exports by region (equation 49).  When export regions are
perfect substitutes (as defined in the subset iecn), the price to each region is the aggregate export
price (equation 50).  The rest of the world (“rt”) can be treated as a large supplier of imports to
each model region at fixed world prices (defined for commodities in the subset iedn).  Or, the
price can be endogenous with the supply curve defined in equation 51 (over the subset ied). 
Equation 52 ensures trade consistency: the quantity of goods country A exports to country B
equals the quantity of goods country B imports from country A.
Imports are treated as imperfect substitutes for domestic goods.  We consider two
functional forms for imports – constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS).  Both specifications are presented here.  Table 9 summarizes the equationsRobinson, Soule, and Weyerbrock (1991) analyze the empirical properties of different
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import aggregation functions in a three-country model of the U.S., European Community, and
rest of world that is bradly similar to our Southern Africa CGE model.  Green and Alston (1990)
discuss the computation of various elasticities in the AIDS system when using the Stone or
translog price indices.
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(56) PM(i,k,k) = PD(i,k) ;
(57) LOG(PQ(i,k)) =  LOG(AQS(i,k)) + SUM(cty2,SMQ0(i,k,cty2)*LOG(PM(i,k,cty2))) ;
                      
(58) SMQ(i,k,cty1) = AMQ(i,k,cty1) + BETAQ(i,k,cty1)*LOG(Q(i,k)) + SUM(cty2, GAMMAQ(i,k,cty1,cty2)*LOG(PM(i,k,cty2)))
;
(59)  SMQ(i,k,k) = 1 - SUM(cty1$pt(k,cty1), SMQ(i,k,cty1)) ;                    
(60) PM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1) =E=smq(i,k,cty1)*PQ(i,k)*Q(i,k) ;
                      
(61) PD(i,k) * D(i,k) = SMQ(i,k,k) * Q(i,k)*PQ(i,k) ;
                             
TABLE 10:  AIDS Import Demand Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
needed for a CES import specification.  The consumer purchases a composite commodity (Q)
made up of imports by region and the domestic variety (equation 53).  For sectors with no
imports (defined by the subset imn), the composite commodity consists only of the domestic
good (equation 54).  Consumers maximize utility by choosing the optimal ratio of imports to the
domestic variety as a function of relative prices (equation 55).  
Alternatively, import demand follow the AIDS specification, as shown in Table 10.  The
expenditure shares, SMQ, are given by equations 58 and 59.  We adopt the convention that when
k = cty1, we are describing the domestic component of composite demand (D).  Hence in
equation 56, the “own” price of imports is simply the domestic price, and in equation 61, D is
determined  by the SMQ share, while the import demands are determined in equation 60.  The i,k,k 
composite price index, PQ, is defined in equation 52 as a Stone price index [Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980)].
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(62) AVWF(iff2,k) =E= SUM(i, (1-ft(i,iff2,k))*wfdist(i,iff2,k)*wf(iff2,k)*fdsc(i,iff2,k))/SUM(j, fdsc(j,iff2,k)) 
                    + dirsh(iff2,k)*DIRPAY(k)/SUM(j, FDSC(j,"rulab","mx")) +LSH(iff2,k)*SUM(i, LFDSC(i,"land2","mx")*                
                    WLC("land2","mx")*WLDIST(i,"land2","mx") )/SUM(j, FDSC(j,"rulab","mx"))  ;                   
(63) (AVWF(la,k)/EXR(k)) =wgdfl(la,k,la,l)*(AVWF(la,l)/EXR(l)) ;
       
(64) (AVWF(“capital”,k)/EXR(k)) =wgdfk(k,l)*(AVWF(“capital”,l)/EXR(l)) ;
(65) AVWF(la,k) =wgdfl(la,k,lb,k)*AVWF(lb,k) ;
       
(66) FS(la,k) =E= FS0(la,k) + MIGL(la,k) + MIGRU(la,k) ;
(67) FS(“capital”,k) =E= FS0(“capital”,k) + MIGK(k) ;
(68) SUM(k, MIGL(la,k)) =E= 0 ;
(69) SUM(la, MIGRU(la,k)) =E=  0 ;
(70) SUM(k, MIGK(k)) =E=  0 ;
TABLE 11: Migration Relations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
Table 11 outlines the labor migration relations in the model.  Equilibrium international
migration levels are determined which maintain a specified ratio of real wages in the two labor
categories in the countries, measured in a common currency. We assume that Mexican rural
workers include direct payments and a share of their land income as part of their wage income
upon which they make their migration decision.  According to equation 63, the international labor
migration equilibrium requires that real average wages (AVWF, described in equation 62) remain
in a fixed ratio (WGDFL) for each migrating labor category in the two countries, measured in a
common currency.  Equation 64 describes the same relationship for capital migration.  Similarly,
internal migration in each country maintains a specified ratio of average real wages between
skilled and unskilled labor markets (the EXR terms become irrelevant), equation 65.  Domestic
labor supply in each skill category in each country is then adjusted by the migrant labor or capital
flows (equations 66 and 67).  Equations 68-70 insure that workers do not “disappear” or get
“created” in migration process.One can approximate equivalent variation with the appropriately defined price index as
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the numeriare in each region.  When the aggregate consumer price index, PINDCON, is held
constant as the numeraire, our Cobb-Douglas price index is consistent with the underlying Cobb-
Douglas utility function.  The changes in consumption levels generated by the model are
approximately equivalent variation.
40
(71) CDH(i,hh,k)  =  CLES(i,hh,k)*(1.0 - MPS(hh,k))*YH(hh,k)*(1.0 - hhtr(hh,k))/PQ(i,k) ;
                   
(72) UTILEQ(hh,k)..      UTIL(hh,k)  = PROD(i, CDH(i,hh,k)**CLES(i,hh,k)) ;
(73)  EVEQ(hh,k)..        EV(hh,k)    = (1.0 - MPS(hh,k))*YH0(hh,k)*(1.0 - hhtr(hh,k)) - YN(hh,k) ;
                   
(74)  YNEQ(hh,k)..        UTIL(hh,k)  = PROD(i,(CLES(i,hh,k)*YN(hh,k)/PQ0(i,k))**CLES(i,hh,k) ) ;                   
Table 12: Welfare Measure in the NAFTA-CGE Model
We use equivalent variation to measure welfare.  It is the amount the consumer would be
willing to pay to avoid the policy change.  First, we describe the consumer’s utility following a
policy shock.  Equation 71 describes household consumption by commodity; utility is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of consumption (equation 72).  We determine the income (YN) necessary to
attain this utility level at the prices the consume faced before the policy shock (PQ0) (equation
74).  Equivalent variation is the base level income minus this hypothetical income (equation 73). 
A negative number indicates a welfare gain because at the original prices the consumer needs
more income to attain the level of utility observed after the price shock.
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Farm program equations appear in Table 13.  Equation 75 indicates the cost of deficiency
payments.  It is the difference between the fixed target price (TP) and the endogenous market
price (PX) for a eligible crops (XP0).    To represent Mexico’s guaranteed price program for corn,
we fix the marked price for corn and allow an endogenous subsidy to corn millers (PSUBU) to
offset the high input cost.  The exogenous subsidies per unit of output are part of insub.  We
convert all farm programs into a rate per unit, or “producer subsidy equivalent,” PIE,  in equation
(76).  This enters the value added price described in equation 16, Table 6.  Total farm program
expenditures are summarized in equation 77.
In addition to explicit payments to producers, we model policies that maintain prices,
quantities and import levels.  We set an upper bound for imports and outputs  in certain sectors
(equations 78 and 79) and a lower bound for producer price in other sectors (equation 80).  There
are complementarity constraints – variables which become endogenous when the constraints
described in equations 78- 80 bind. For the supply management program, when the output
constraint binds, the variable SCALE becomes less than one; when the constraint does not bind,
SCALE equals one.  To maintain the producer price, PX, above a lower bound, TE becomes
positive; otherwise it is zero.  Finally, to maintain an upper bound on imports, TM3, the tariff rate




(81) Q(i,k) = INT(i,k)+CDD(i,k)+GD(i,k)+ID(i,k)+DST(i,k);
(82) FS(iff2,k) = SUM(i, FDSC(i,iff2,k)) ;
(83)    FSAG(k) = SUM(iag, FDSC(iag,“capital”,k)) ;
(84) FSL(l,k) = SUM(i, LFDSC(i,l,k)) ;
(85) FSAV(k,cty1) = SUM(i, PWM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1)) = SUM(i, PWE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1)) ;
              
(86) FBAL(k) = SUM(cty1, FSAV(k,cty1)) ;
Table 14: Market-Clearing Equations in the NAFTA-CGE Model
To complete the model, there are a number of additional, “market-clearing” or equilibrium
conditions that must be satisfied, as shown in Table 14.  Equation 81 is the material balance
equation for each sector, requiring that total composite supply (Q) equal the sum of composite
demands.  Equations 82 - 84 provides equilibrium in each factor market.  Equation 85 is the
balance condition in the foreign exchange market, requiring that import expenditures equal the
sum of export earnings and net foreign capital inflows; equation 86 is the overall trade balance
equation, summing up the bilateral trade balances.
Model Closure
The NAFTA-CGE model permits a number of different “closure”choices that affect the
macroeconomic relationships in the model.  In all simulations reported in this paper, we have
assumed that the aggregate trade balance (FBAL) is constant for each country, and that the
exchange rate (EXR) varies to achieve external balance. Total government spending (GDTOT)
and fixed investment (ZFIX) are fixed exogenously.    In the government budget constraint,
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equation 34, savings (GOVSAV) and farm program expenditures (FPE) are endogenous, while 
household transfers (HHT) and enterprise transfers are exogenous.  Since investment is fixed,
some component of aggregate savings must be free to move; we require that the enterprise
savings rate (ESR) adjust to achieve savings-investment balance.   We allow rural-urban
migration in Mexico, with the factor supply adjusting to maintain average wage differentials.
These average wage differentials include payment a share of land return and a share of income
from direct payments (see equation 62).   All other factors are held in fixed supply and  the wage
to adjusts.